

PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS

OF THE

ART OF WAR;

OUTPOST SERVICE;

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR BATTLE;

REVIEWS.

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BY

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DE LA GARDE IMPERIALE.

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## PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF WAR, ETC.,

EXTRACTED, ARRANGED, AND PUBLISHED BY GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD, C. S. A., FOR THE USE OF GENERAL OFFICERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA.

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### PRINCIPLES.

The whole science of War may be briefly defined as the art of placing in the right position, at the right time, a mass of troops greater than your enemy can there oppose to you.

PRINCIPLE No. 1.—*To place masses of your army in contact with fractions of your enemy.*

PRINCIPLE No. 2.—*To operate as much as possible on the communications of your enemy without exposing your own.*

PRINCIPLE No. 3.—*To operate always on interior lines (or shorter ones in point of time).*

Every true *maxim* in war can be deduced from the above given *principles*, it being of course understood that they are to be reversed in speaking of the operations of the enemy—i. e., care must be taken, first, to prevent your enemy from bringing the mass of his forces in contact with fractions of your own, or large fractions against small ones; second, to prevent him from operating on your communications without exposing his own; third, to prevent his moving on interior or shorter lines.

These three principles supply an infallible test by which to judge of every military plan: for no combination can be well conceived, no maxim founded in truth, which is at variance with them.

By operating on the interior lines which the distribution of your adversary affords you, you may march against one of his separated fractions with your whole force, and after destroying it proceed to the next, and so on; you will thus defeat them in detail by bringing the mass of your army in contact with successive fractions of your enemy. Principle 3 indicates that the hostile fraction which you should first attack is one of the flanks, since it will take the enemy double the time to concentrate his whole force on either flank that would be required to effect his concentration on the centre.

In war it is an axiom that *every possible chance of success must be enlisted on your side.*

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## MAXIMS.

MAXIM 1.—*Never abandon your line of communication from over-confidence.*

MAXIM 2.—*Although it is a maxim never to abandon your line of communication, yet to change that line is one of the most skilful manœuvres of the art of war, where circumstances authorize it.*

MAXIM 3.—*If you march to the conquest of a country with two or three armies which have each its line of operation toward a fixed point where they are to unite, it is a maxim that the union of these different corps d'armée must never take place near the enemy, because not only may the enemy, by concentrating his forces, prevent their junction, but he may moreover beat them in detail.*

The route by which an army marches toward its object



must be sheltered by its own frontiers, or by some natural obstacle throughout as great an extent as is possible.

That part of the base of operations is the most advantageous to break out from into the theatre of war which conducts the most directly upon the enemy's flank or rear.

MAXIM 4.—*An army ought to have but one line of operation, which it must carefully guard and never abandon, except from an overruling necessity.*

MAXIM 5.—*When two armies are ranged in battle, and one of them has but one point to retreat upon, while the other can retreat on all the points of the compass, all the advantage is with the last. It is in such a case that a commander should be bold to strike great blows, and manoeuvre on his enemy's flank. Victory is in his hands.*

MAXIM 6.—*It is one of the most important principles of war to unite the scattered bodies of an army at the point which is the most distant and the best protected from the attempts of an enemy.*

MAXIM 7.—*To operate by lines distant from each other, and without intercommunication, is a fault which generally leads to another. The advancing columns of an army must be in constant communication with each other, so that an enemy can not penetrate between them.*

MAXIM 8.—*The communication between the different fractions of an army, whether in position or in movement, must always be perfectly open and easy.*

MAXIM 9.—*To besiege a fortified place whose possession would be useless to yourself, and which gives the enemy no power of annoyance, is to waste time and means.*

The places which an invading army is justified in besieging are such as come within the meaning of the definitions of *strategical points* and *decisive points*.

Every point on the theatre of war, whatever be its nat-

ure, which conduces in any manner to strengthen your line of operation or of communication is a *strategical point*.

*Decisive strategical points* are those only which are decisive in insuring the success of any operations of strategy, either for offence or defence.

MAXIM 10.—*The excellence of a position is always relative:*

1st. *To that occupied by the enemy.*

2d. *To the number of troops intended to line it.*

3d. *To the composition of those troops.*

MAXIM 11.—*A position must not be commanded by heights in the direction of the enemy within artillery range.*

MAXIM 12.—*Every position must cover the line of communication of the army with its base.*

MAXIM 13.—*The lines by which the army must retreat from its position, if defeated, must be as numerous and easy as possible.*

In forming a line of battle, special respect must be had to the line or lines by which the army may be obliged to retire. The more directly these lead toward the base of operation the better. The more of these lines available, the greater the security in which the army will fight, and the greater the probability that, if defeated, it will be able to effect its retreat without any overwhelming disaster.

MAXIM 14.—*The part or parts of a line of battle which are in front of any line or lines of retreat must be made the strongest (if not so already from natural causes), either by entrenchments or by posting the greatest force at such parts of your line.*

If the enemy attack and break that part of your line which is in front of your line of retreat your army, divided into two parts, may be forced back toward the flanks, and the enemy may gain possession of your line of retreat.

MAXIM 15.—*Every position must afford easy communication, in rear of the line, between the different parts of your line of battle.*



MAXIM 16.—*The ground in front of your position should be such as to impede the movements of an enemy advancing to attack you, and should be so completely commanded by your position as to insure its being swept by your artillery to the full extent of its range.*

Such ground will be more slowly traversed by the enemy; he will be exposed for a longer time to the fire of your guns, which will have the effect of disordering his march, and damping his ardor in a degree proportioned to the difficulty of the ground he has to pass over.

MAXIM 17.—*Every position must afford secure protection to the flanks of your army.*

This is a deduction from Principles 1 and 2, since its observance will prevent the enemy from applying them at your expense—

Principle 1, by placing himself in such a position as will enable him to attack the flank of your line, the nature of which manœuvre is to bring masses of the attacking force in contact with successive fractions of the line attacked.

Principle 2, by turning your flank and acting on your line of retreat.

Strong natural obstacles afford the best protection, such as mountains, large rivers, impenetrable woods, marshes, etc. Where these do not exist the flanks must be strengthened by artificial means.

MAXIM 18.—*A position cannot be too strong; lose no opportunity of strengthening it by means of field-works.*

The natural positions which are generally met with can not protect an army from the attacks of a superior force without the aid of art.

MAXIM 19.—*Occupy your position in such a manner that you can defend a part of it with a smaller force than that which the enemy can bring against it, so that the greater part of your force may be available to assail the weaker of the enemy.*

If two armies, A and B, of 20,000 men each, occupy

lines of equal length; but A, by reason of the ground being naturally stronger on the right half of his line, or by reason of entrenchments, is able to occupy that half effectively with only 5,000 men, while the force of B is equally disseminated, then (to use a technical term) the 5,000 of A *contain* 10,000 of B; while A has 15,000 wherewith to overwhelm the opposing 10,000 of B.

If your force is superior to that of the enemy, you should not therefore occupy a greater front than that of the enemy, but hold your surplus troops in hand ready to take advantage of any opening that may be afforded. You will thus be able to insure the superiority at the decisive point and time.

If A and B consist respectively of 20,000 and 10,000 men, and A occupies a front twice as extended as that of B, then A loses the advantage of numbers, for B can bring to bear on an opposite part of A's line a force equal to that which can oppose it, and that part may be broken before succor from the distant portions of A's line can arrive.

It must never be forgotten that *it is not the number of troops ranged in order of battle which decides the victory, but the number which is actually put in vigorous action by a commander.*

MAXIM 20.—*When on the eve of a battle recall all your detachments; do not neglect one, however small: one battalion the more sometimes decides the day.*

In the same manner as no part of a position can be too strong, a master of the art of war will never consider that he has too many troops, no matter how small may be his enemy's force.

MAXIM 21.—*Never detach a force, either on the eve or on the day of a battle, for the purpose of co-operating with your main body in attacking the enemy, unless your communications with the detachment can be constantly maintained.*

Unless communication is maintained, there can be no

concert. Nothing should be left to accident. If a force be detached to such a distance that its communication with the main body is not constant and *rapid*, however well a combination may be conceived, a thousand accidents may disconcert it.

If a body of troops be detached to a distance from the main army round a flank of the enemy, for the purpose of attacking the enemy in rear in an approaching battle, a watchful enemy will learn the movement and overwhelm the detachment.

MAXIM 22.—*Never leave intervals between the different divisions of your line of battle where the enemy might penetrate, unless to draw him into a snare.*

It results as a corollary from the last maxim, that you must never weaken any part of your line to such an extent that a vigorous attack upon it by the enemy will probably succeed, and enable him to act as has been above described; also that, unless you have a great superiority of force, it is dangerous to attack an enemy's line by both extremities at once; for, as both attacks must be reinforced at the expense of your centre, your centre becomes weakened, and a counter-attack upon it by the enemy may succeed.

MAXIM 23.—*Never attack with a fraction of your force when a short delay will enable you to attack with masses.*

The temptation or supposed necessity may sometimes be great, but yielding to it will almost invariably increase the evil it is intended to remedy.

MAXIM 24.—*Nothing can be more rash or contrary to the principles of war than to make a flank march before an enemy in position.*

MAXIM 25.—*There are two ways of obliging an enemy to abandon a position, viz: by attacking and driving him from it, and by manœuvring so as to make it impossible for him to hold it.*

The first method should only be adopted when, in consequence of your having a superior force, or of the enemy's position being faulty, it is your object to bring on a decisive engagement.

The mode of applying the second is in general to threaten the enemy's line of communication.

MAXIM 26.—*An attack on the enemy's centre, if successful, is in general the most decisive. That on a flank is the most secure.*

The centre of a line is not only the strongest naturally, from its position enabling it to be *doubly* reinforced from each wing in half the time required to reinforce one wing from the other, but, in addition, its strength is artificially increased by every possible means; the fire of the guns of a position likewise, all converging on the ground over which the enemy must advance to attack the centre, renders the attack on that point more doubtful than one upon a flank. As a general rule the attack of a position should be made on the weakest points, or on points which are so decisive that an attack upon any other is impossible or dangerous, so long as they remain in the enemy's possession.

The weakest points are the flanks when not supported, or any salient points of the enemy's line which are not well defended by his artillery in position, or any point of his line where he has left an interval, or which he has not occupied in sufficient force.

In choosing a point of attack, one should be preferred from which the assailants, if repulsed, may with safety retreat, rather than another which may offer greater temptations to attack, but the line of retreat from which would be exposed.

MAXIM 27.—*If your enemy is entrenching and it is your intention to attack his position, do not delay a moment. Every hour's delay may cost the loss of 1,000 men in an assault.*

MAXIM 28.—*An army on the march and an army in position*



*in an enemy's country, should never be for one moment without its advanced guard and its advanced posts.*

There are two descriptions of advanced posts, viz: those which are to be maintained against attack to the last, and those which are only to be defended sufficiently long to enable the army they cover to form in order of battle before an enemy can attack it.

No precaution, therefore, which will strengthen such posts and enable the defenders to keep the enemy at bay, if only for five minutes, should be neglected. An officer is not worthy of the name who, in command of an outpost, does not feel that the safety of the whole army may depend on his individual vigilance, who neglects any possible expedient to strengthen his post, and who does not make himself thoroughly acquainted with the ground to a considerable distance around it, asking himself frequently what he should do if attacked.

MAXIM 29.—*To defend a defile, never take post in front, but always in rear of the defile.*

This will enable the defenders to attack with their whole force any fraction of the enemy they may think proper to allow to emerge from the defile.

No position, however good otherwise, should be occupied by an army which has a defile in its rear through which the army must retreat if defeated. A retreat through a defile before an enemy is always disastrous.

The case of an army defending the head of a bridge is an exception to this.

It follows that you should never lose an opportunity of attacking an enemy in retreat, while in the act of passing a defile, allowing any portion of his army you think proper to enter it, and then attacking with your whole force the remaining fraction.

All passes over mountains are of the nature of defiles.

A bridge is essentially a defile; and, in the same way as important passes are defended by forts, a bridge over a great river is defended by fortifications of more or less strength.



MAXIM 30.—*Every disadvantage may be removed by skill or fortune, except TIME. If a General has TIME against him, he must fail. And conversely, TIME is the best ally.*

MAXIM 31.—*As a general rule the column of divisions is the most convenient order of march; the line is the best formation for collision.*

Every rule in war may, if true, be traced to one of the three principles. The present is derived from No. 1, as by attacking lines with columns, the greater number of the men composing the column are unable either to fire or act offensively in any manner, while every man in the line can be brought into play, thus bringing the greater number of the line in contact with the smaller of the column.

It must be borne in mind that no rule can be absolute in war; every one is subject to modification from actual circumstances. Although the column is the most convenient order of march generally, and the only safe order when exposed to cavalry attack, it is not always the safest.

MAXIM 32.—*All movements of troops must be made in such a manner as will expose them to the least possible amount of injury from an enemy.*

Therefore, in the case where troops advancing to attack an enemy's position are exposed to the fire of a powerful artillery, the advance should be made in line.

MAXIM 33.—*All movements in presence of an enemy must be made in that order which will admit of the formation of the line of battle in the shortest possible time.*

This maxim is peculiarly applicable to a flank march within reach of an enemy, or to a movement whose object is to prolong one flank. In moving to the front when threatened by cavalry, the march is executed in column at quarter-distance, because from that formation the order of battle is assumed in the shortest possible time (viz: that of the square).

In moving to a flank within reach of an enemy, where

cavalry attack is not imminent, or where sufficient protection is afforded by the cavalry of the army so moving, the march should be executed in column at full distance, because (the line having been established as the proper order for collision—see Maxim 31), from that formation, line is formed with the least possible delay by a simple wheel of divisions into line.

When it is desired to prolong a line to one flank to a comparatively small extent, it may be done by the march of successive battalions or brigades from the other flank in rear of the line. The flank march is in this case protected and concealed by the general line.

When time presses, the same object may be accomplished by moving up to the flank of the first line the nearest battalions or brigades of the second line, making a simultaneous flank movement of the second line to a sufficient extent to cover the prolongation of the first, and supplying its deficiency on the other flank by battalions or brigades drawn from the first line.

MAXIM 34.—*Of all the attacks to which a body of troops can be exposed, that upon a flank is the most dangerous.*

This is deduced from Principle 1. For, suppose a battalion in line, which we may call A, to be attacked by another line, B, which has succeeded in establishing itself perpendicularly to the direction of A, on one of its flanks. The commander of A will endeavor to change his front so as to form a line parallel to B, in order to meet its attack. Should B be at a sufficient distance to enable A to complete its change of front, no inconvenience will ensue; but if not, only a part of A will have been able to assume the required parallel formation at the time when it is attacked by B's whole force, and driven back on the remaining divisions of the battalion, which will be attacked and overthrown by B in succession.

The most advantageous direction which a line can assume for the purpose of attacking another line in flank is perpendicular to that of the line to be attacked; and the more nearly perpendicular the greater is the advantage.

The attack on the head of a column is analogous to that on the flank of a line; but it is more ruinous in its effects.

The echelon formation combines to a certain extent the advantages of the line and column. For mere changes of position, the movement in oblique echelon saves much time. For an advance against an enemy in position, the direct echelon formation presents advantages afforded by no other. It combines the greater correctness of the march in column with the superior force, for collision, of the line.

The head of the echelon is the only part the enemy can attack without exposing his own flank. The retired flank can only be turned by a long march on the part of the enemy; it may therefore be considered safe, and the advanced wing, with which you first attack, may be reinforced at the expense of that which is retired. Thus, in less than the time which would be required by the enemy to turn the retired flank, you may gain some decided advantage with the other.

In general terms, the advantages of the echelon formation are that one flank is thereby secure from attack—each division of the echelon covers the flank of that which precedes it, and the exposed flank may be reinforced at the expense of the other; thereby observing Maxim 19, since, by reason of the distance which separates them, one wing of the enemy is held in check by the retired wing of the echelon, which has been weakened in order to reinforce the head of the echelon which is the point of collision.

The retired flank being safe, it remains only to secure the head of the echelon from flank attack.

In case of there being no flank support for the head of the echelon, the greater part of the artillery and cavalry must support that flank.

If two armies of equal strength are opposed to each other, and one of them has its flanks strongly posted, while one or both of the flanks of the other are unsupported, the general line of the last may be parallel to that of the first, and the exposed flank or flanks may be protected by several bodies of troops being posted in echelon to their rear; the

enemy dare not attack the exposed flank, because his own flank would be in danger from the troops in echelon, and he could not make a long flank march to turn the flank of those troops without exposing his line of retreat.

Frederick's system was to attack one wing of his enemy's army with one of his own wings, reinforced for that purpose at the expense of the other, remedying the weakness of his other wing by removing it beyond the reach of attack. He formed his line obliquely to that of the enemy, and then marched in the prolongation of his own line until he outflanked the wing he designed to attack.

When an army from the parallel order assumes the oblique order with respect to an enemy, the first consideration must be the line of retreat. The usual means of effecting the change is by keeping one flank in its original position and throwing back the other.

The general of an army which has effected such a change of front should, as a general rule, post the greater strength of his second line in rear of his advanced wing, and hold his reserve somewhere behind the centre of that wing.

Such a change of position, however, in presence of a watchful and able enemy ought to be impossible; and it is only by surprise that a general can hope to place his army *en masse* in a position to attack one of his enemy's flanks.

In order to attempt successfully the oblique order by a flank march in the neighborhood of an enemy, the march of the army must be concealed from the enemy.

The line of retreat of the army which takes the oblique order must always be in rear of the advanced wing.

The greater the obliquity of the army to the enemy's line the greater the security of the refused flank from counter-attack, and the greater the probability of success. And this only brings us to the perfection of flank attack, which is when the direction of the army is perpendicular to that of the enemy.

If an enemy endeavors to turn one of your flanks by moving his whole army to that flank there are several modes of defeating his intention.



1st. If he marches in such an order that he can not readily resume his line of battle facing your army, make a vigorous attack on the flank of his march along his whole line.

2d. If he marches as above in loose order, so as to leave any large interval between the different divisions of his army, attack one of the separated portions—suppose the rear portion—by interposing a body of troops between it and the rest of the army, to stop the head of its march while you direct other troops against the flank of its march.

3d. If he marches compactly, and in such an order as will enable him to reform his line in a moment, you must choose the head or the rear of his line of march for attack; but the attack must be made with method and supported by cavalry, or the enemy's cavalry (which will be found at both those points) will take your infantry in flank.

4th. You may prolong your line to the threatened flank by either of the methods already given, and turn the tables on the enemy by outflanking him.

The effective force of an army in battle depends chiefly on the rapidity and precision with which it can manœuvre; and the basis of its excellence in this particular is found in the proficiency of each battalion and squadron in field movements. The effective force of an army in a campaign depends mainly on the regularity and rapidity with which its marches are conducted; and as the success of an action may often be influenced by the order of march in which an army approaches an enemy in position, it is impossible that the troops can be too much practised in every possible order of march.

In all armies, ancient and modern, the line of battle has been divided into units, whose magnitude has been determined by the average range of the human voice. The unit should be as large as is consistent with the possibility of the men composing it, when formed in line, being directed by the voice of their commander.

The battalion is taken as the unit of the infantry line.



The squadron and the battery as that of the cavalry and artillery respectively.

In our army 500 men in two ranks form a line of about 150 yards, as many as are usually found in the field, supernumeraries and non-effectives being taken into account: i. e.,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  men to one yard, or 5,867 to one mile; or 5,000 men to one mile, allowing for space between regiments, etc.; a greater extent of line might be inconvenient, although it is certain that in an attack the larger the mass to which unity of impulse can be communicated without confusion the greater will be the chances of success.

The art of directing troops in battle consists in the just employment of the three arms in such a manner that they shall mutually support and defend each other to as great an extent as possible. No fixed rule can be laid down as to their relative proportion in the composition of an army. That must depend very much on the nature of the country in which an army operates.

But where such country is favorable to the march and action of those arms, a good proportion is—

Cavalry, one-fifth of the infantry; artillery, three guns for every thousand men of infantry and cavalry united.

Nothing can be more opposed to the rules of war than for infantry alone to attack an enemy's infantry in position which is defended by artillery. The fire of the latter will throw the attacking force into confusion, and will expose it to an easy overthrow if it should succeed in reaching the position to be assaulted.

When an officer is on active service in the field, everything connected with the daily life of his men should be an object of constant attention; no detail is beneath him. He must not think the arms and ammunition his most important charge, and that if they be in fighting order he need not trouble himself much about the rest.

The arms are the fighting weapons, but the soldier is the machine which wields them; and it is to him—to clothing his back, and feeding his belly, and looking after his health and comfort—that the great attention is due. The arms

and ammunition must of course be always in perfect order, but they are only required when in contact with an enemy. The natural condition of a soldier on service is the line of march. He will have at least twenty days marching to one of fighting; and he has to be preserved in health and comfort during those twenty days, otherwise his musket and pouch would do small service on the twenty-first day.

An officer should go among his men and himself look after their comfort. No fear of their losing respect for him because he does so. At the end of a march, he should never feel at liberty to attend to his own wants until he has seen his men engaged in cooking their meals. The rapidity with which a regiment has its fires lighted after a march, and meals cooked, may be regarded as a test of the attention paid by the officers to the comfort of their men.

Similarly before a march, an officer should take care that none of his men leave their encampment or bivouac without as good a meal as circumstances permit.

As regards equipment for the field, an officer must have as few wants as possible; and he should carefully study the art of putting up the articles it is necessary he should possess in the smallest possible compass. The line of march must be considered as the natural condition of a soldier, and everything regulated with that view.

An officer charged with the arrangement of any military movement or operation should on no account trust to the intelligence of subordinates who are to execute it. He should anticipate and provide against every misconception or stupidity it is possible to foresee, and give all the minute directions he would think necessary if he knew the officer charged with the execution of the operation to be the most stupid of mankind.

No amount of disapprobation of his general's plans can justify an officer in canvassing those plans with others, and openly finding fault with them. A great many young gentlemen (and old gentlemen too, for that matter) set up for generals, and habitually ridicule the dispositions of their superiors. Such a practice is insubordinate and mis-

chievous in the highest degree; the soldiers acquire the habit from those whose duty it is to set an example; they lose that confidence in their general which is one of the principal elements of success in military operations, and infinite mischief results.

## OUTPOST SERVICE.

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1. The commanders of all detached army corps, divisions, brigades, or regiments of this army, on arriving at a position to be occupied, will carefully reconnoitre, personally and by staff officers, the ground in the vicinity, and all roads and approaches thereto, for a distance of several miles, especially in the known direction of the enemy. The best positions for holding all such approaches under vigilant observation, and for the prevention of surprise, will be carefully selected for the advanced line of picket sentries, which shall not be less than one mile distant from the main body of the command, nor more than three miles. The force to be employed in this outpost service shall habitually be not less than one-fifth of the command from which it may be detached, and the tour of duty will be for three days.

2. The post of the regiment, battalion, or detachment on outpost service, will be selected at a convenient central point, about half a mile in rear of the front line to be occupied by sentinels; and *there* will be the reserve, and place for baggage and cooking. One-third of the command or detachment will be thrown forward in three equal parties, equidistant from each other, to within two hundred yards of the extreme picket front; and from these detachments smaller detachments, each of from three to six privates, with a commissioned or non-commissioned officer in charge, from which a continuous line of sentries will be established along the entire front to be held and observed, connecting at all times with the sentinels on the right and left, thrown forward either by the pickets, posts



of the same regiment, battalion, or detachment, or established from other regiments, battalions, or detachments on outpost service. At night the number of sentinels will be doubled.

3. Sentinels on picket should be so established as to observe as much, and as far, as possible, while themselves concealed from observation by the enemy. Loud talking, singing, whistling, and fires, except at the reserve—and, in very cold weather, on the line of company or detachment reserves — is strictly prohibited. Citizens must not be allowed to stay or lounge about the picket posts, or converse with pickets; this is particularly enjoined: for, under the pretence of hospitality, and the simulation of the simple countryman, an insidious spy may be lurking to discover our signals of recognition, countersigns, passwords, or other information, to be betrayed to our injury.

4. Officers, and non-commissioned officers and soldiers, on picket service, are at all times dressed and equipped. The commander of each outpost command will make frequent visits and inspections of his advanced detachments, picket posts, and front line of sentinels; and he will be responsible for any surprise of his lines, or lax, negligent performance of picket service by his officers and men during the tour. He will give proper instructions to all under his command, touching their several duties, and should satisfy himself that those instructions are well understood and rigidly executed. His adjutant, or some other officer selected for the duty, will also visit each picket post and sentry once each night, between twelve o'clock and daylight.

5. When a day signal of recognition has been arranged for any picket line, it will be demanded as soon as the parties see each other. At night parties approaching will be halted at a distance of sixty yards, if practicable, in a loud, distinct tone, and the signal demanded. The party challenged will then require a response from the challenging party; this made, the latter will order the former to advance and give the countersign. Commanders of out-



posts will be careful not to prevent nor delay the passing of cavalry pickets, or couriers with despatches; but when reasonable doubts arise as to the character of the party, he must be sent, under charge of guard, at once to the headquarters of the nearest general officer. A mounted man will not be required to dismount to give the countersign, after having made the proper signal, nor will the countersign be required in the daytime. Great circumspection must be exercised in the use of signals, to prevent their observation by lurking spies of the enemy.

6. An approach of the enemy must be resisted by the pickets as obstinately as practicable; the ground must only be yielded before an overwhelming force; they will then retire, fighting, on the reserve, where a stand will be made as long as practicable. If forced to retire, they will take up successive positions behind all advantageous shelter, and resolutely check and retard the advance of the enemy as long as possible. The best marksmen will be selected to cover the rear, while thus falling back, who will fire with deliberation as they retire. If pressed closely by the enemy, the command must be brought, if possible, to charge with the bayonet. The utmost care must be taken to prevent the men from crowding *en masse*, in falling back, as they will offer a target for artillery; and the men must be cautioned against, and prevented from making a precipitate retreat from an outpost, under any circumstances.

7. While on outpost duty, no officer or soldier will be permitted to leave the outpost, without express authority from the commander, except upon a surgeon's certificate. Commanders of outposts must remain constantly during the tour with their reserve, except when visiting the picket posts and sentries, in which case, they will leave these instructions with the officer next in command.

8. In marching to and from outposts, the utmost order and discipline will be preserved. *No straggling must be permitted.*

9. As soon as the pickets may become seriously engaged with the enemy, any baggage at the post of the reserve

will be immediately sent to the rear, to the baggage of the brigade to which the detachment belongs. Troops on outpost service are expected to bivouac.

10. As soon as the enemy shall have developed with certainty a design to advance, the commanders of outposts will at once despatch couriers to the general commanding the corps or division to which the outpost belongs, giving information of the movements of the enemy, his probable strength, kind of force, and whether moving rapidly or not, route or routes taken, and such other information as may be of service. The report of mere rumored movements must always be avoided, or at least distinguished from what may be ascertained by the military.

11. The commander of each outpost will publish these orders every tour, before establishing his picket post or posting his picket sentries; they will likewise be read to each company or detachment of the line of advanced picket parties. They will be carefully preserved, and transferred to the next commanders of the outpost.

12. Any person found in the act of eluding the outposts, and failing to halt when directed to do so, will be fired upon by the sentinels; and any person, if suspected of eluding the outposts, will be at once arrested and sent to the nearest provost marshal.

13. Cavalry pickets will be required, by sentries and picket posts, to show authority of their colonel or other commander for the service before being allowed to pass; and couriers, with despatches, must be furnished with passes properly signed.

14. The roll of troops at outposts must be called frequently during the day, and at retreat there shall be an inspection of arms and ammunition.

15. Staff officers may be sent by the general, or other officer in command, to inspect the outposts of his command.

16. Sentries must always be ready to fire, but will be sure of the presence of the enemy before firing, and will carefully avoid *false alarms*. Once satisfied that the enemy

is at hand, the sentinel, though all defence on his part may be useless, must fire, as the safety of the army may depend on the alarm he will then give. Picket sentries should be relieved every hour at night, and, as a precaution against surprise, should be instructed in some signal for the night before giving the countersign to others of the same outpost detachment.

17. In the immediate or near presence of the enemy the main and company reserves must stand to their arms for an hour immediately before daybreak. Patrols will be made slowly, silently, and with the utmost precaution, to insure against surprise or being mistaken for the enemy by our own men. When patrols are sent out information of the fact must be spread throughout the picket posts and sentries.

#### CAVALRY PICKETS AND VEDETTES.

18. In addition to infantry outposts, the whole front of any force in position or camp must be completely observed and covered by cavalry; all commanding points of observation will be occupied; and all possible avenues of approach will be watched, as near to the enemy's lines as the nature of the country will admit, or he will permit without substantial resistance. Positions must be avoided which the enemy can approach under cover or turn. There must be an unbroken line of communication on the right and left, between all the posts and vedettes. The horse should be relieved by his rider as much as possible, but when near the *enemy the vedette must never quit his rein or take off bridle or saddle.*

19. Cavalry picket detachments, when practicable, will consist of entire companies, and each company will cover its proportion of the front to be occupied. The picket posts, detached in advance, will not be of less than one non-commissioned officer and three troopers each. The captain of each company will serve as *officer of the guard* for his company on picket service, and a field officer, or

senior captain, will be *officer of the day* for the whole line of the regiment, battalion, or squadron on outpost duty.

20. The company commander will be habitually with the reserve, established at a central point in rear of the picket posts.



## GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR BATTLE.

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1. Field and company officers are specially enjoined to instruct their men, under all circumstances, to fire with deliberation at the feet of the enemy; they will thus avoid overshooting, and, besides, wounded men give more trouble to our adversary than his dead, as they have to be taken from the field.

2. Officers in command must be cool and collected in action, hold their men in hand, and caution them against useless, aimless firing. The men must be instructed and required each one to single out his mark. It was the deliberate sharp-shooting of our forefathers in the Revolution of 1776, and at New Orleans, in 1815, which made them so formidable against the odds with which they were engaged.

3. In the beginning of a battle, except by troops deployed as skirmishers, the fire by file will be avoided; it excites the men, and renders their subsequent control difficult; fire by wing or company should be resorted to instead. During the battle, the officers and non-commissioned officers must keep the men in ranks, enforce obedience, and encourage and stimulate them if necessary.

4. Soldiers must not be permitted to quit the ranks to strip or rob the dead, nor even to assist in removing our own dead, unless by special permission, which shall only be given when the action has been decided. The surest way to protect our wounded is to drive the enemy from the field; the most pressing, highest duty is to win the victory.

5. Before the battle, the quartermaster of the division will make all the necessary arrangements for the imme-



mediate transportation of the wounded from the field. After consulting with the medical officers, he will establish the ambulance depot in the rear, and give his assistants the necessary instructions for the efficient service of the ambulance wagons and other means of transportation.

6. The ambulance depot, to which the wounded are to be conveyed or directed for immediate treatment, should be established at the most convenient building nearest the field of battle. A red flag marks the place and way to it.

7. Before and immediately after battle the roll of each company will be called, and absentees must strictly account for their absence from the ranks. To quit their standard on the battle-field, under fire, under the pretence of removing or aiding the wounded, will not be permitted. Any one persisting in it will be shot on the spot; and whoever shall be found to have quit the field, or his regiment, or company without authority will be regarded and proclaimed as a coward, and dealt with accordingly.

8. The active ambulances will follow the troops to succor the wounded, and to remove them to the depots. Before the engagement INFIRMARY detachments will also be detailed and organized, of three (the least effective under arms) from each company, whose duties will be hereinafter prescribed. *These men must not loiter about the depots, but will return promptly to the field as soon as possible.*

9. The Infirmary detachments will be under the immediate orders of the medical officers on the field. This corps is to go upon the field unarmed, except the non-commissioned officers, who are to protect the corps against stragglers and marauders. The members will be provided with one litter to every two men, and each with a badge by which he can be easily distinguished from the rest of the command; also with leather shoulder-straps, a canteen of water, a tin cup, a haversack, containing an eighth-pound of lint, four bandages, two long and two short splints of wood, sponges and tourniquets, and a pint bottle of alcoholic stimulants.

10. It shall be the duty of this corps, under the imme-

ciate direction of the assistant surgeon of the regiment, accompanied by the ambulances or wagons, to follow up promptly the action, administering to the immediate wants of the wounded, by giving stimulus, checking hemorrhage, and the temporary splinting of fractures.

11. Those who are too much disabled to walk will be removed to some ambulance depot, previously agreed upon, where they will be left in charge of the surgeon of the regiment. The removal of the wounded from the field will devolve upon the Infirmary corps, and all men straggling from the ranks under pretext of aiding this corps will be summarily dealt with, to which end the medical officers in charge and the non-commissioned officers are specially required to report to the regimental commanders of the stragglers their names, and the companies to which they may belong.

12. The assistant surgeon in charge of the Infirmary corps should provide himself with a pocket-case, ligatures, needles, pins, chloroform, napkins, brandy or whiskey, tourniquets, bandages, lint, and spirits. To obviate the shock of the nervous system, to suppress hemorrhage, to put fractures in some temporary apparatus, so as to facilitate the removal of the wounded, should be his first care. This last is best accomplished by placing under the fractured limb a piece of old linen or cotton of the form of a pocket-handkerchief; on the opposite and outer edges of this are placed the splints, which are rolled up in it, toward the lint, on each side, until the fracture is snugly supported in the intervening space; the whole to be secured by two or three bands of tape or bandage.

13. The regimental surgeon should, before an action, satisfy himself by personal inspection that all the means and appliances for carrying the wounded are at hand; give instructions to the Infirmary corps as to the application of a tourniquet to restrain dangerous hemorrhage; establish depots for the wounded, under the supervision of the medical director; and render to the men of his regiment all necessary surgical aid; performing there all operations that are

required; and he will be held responsible that he has at his disposition all the means, supplies, and appliances for the proper performance of the service enjoined, or has taken all proper measures to secure them. He will instruct all detailed to assist him not to allow ambulances to be monopolized by wounded officers to the exclusion of others. He will forbid any of the Infirmary corps to hold officers' horses on the field, or to do anything but what strictly appertains to their duty. The surgeon should not devote himself exclusively to a wounded officer, nor leave his post to accompany him to the rear.

14. Wounds will be dressed and operations performed as far as practicable *on the field*, and patients made as comfortable as circumstances will admit for transportation to hospitals in the interior.

15. Surgeons will supply themselves with hospital flags, and will have them attached to the ambulances and placed conspicuously over the field infirmaries and hospitals.

16. As soon as possible after an action, surgeons will transmit to the medical director a return of casualties according to the following form:

*Return of Killed and Wounded in the ——— Regiment in the  
Action of ———.*

	KILLED .....	WOUNDED.			TOTAL WOUNDED..	REMARKS.
		Dangerously..	Severely ....	Slightly.....		
Officers .....					Names of Officers killed and wounded to be inserted here.	
N. C. Officers..						
Privates.....						

17. The material for the badges and for the ambulance flags prescribed in paragraph VI will be provided by the quartermaster's department.

## REVIEWS.

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1. The reviewing officer, upon his arrival on the ground, will receive an artillery salute when entitled to it, unless otherwise specially ordered. Nine guns will be fired for a General of the Confederate army, eight for a Lieutenant-General, seven for a Major-General, and six for a Brigadier-General.

2. The reviewing officer having taken his position near the camp color, placed beforehand at a suitable distance in front of the line, the district or other commander of the forces, part of which are about to be reviewed, will, if present, and of an inferior rank to the reviewing officer, take place one step to the left, the head of his horse on a line with the haunches of the reviewing officer's horse.

Any invited guest will take his position on the left of the district or other commander of the forces.

3. The chief of staff, when on the ground, will be three steps to the rear and one to the left of the general. The other members of the staff of the reviewing officer will form in one rank if their number does not exceed eight, and in two ranks if more than eight, at a distance of at least eight paces to the rear and left, the officers of the personal staff on the right of the line, according to rank, and the right of the line directly behind the reviewing officer.

4. The staff of the district or other commander of the forces to be reviewed, or of any general officer taking position near the reviewing officer, will form in rear of staff of latter, in accordance with the third clause of these orders.



5. When the reviewing officer advances to review the line, the district or other commander of the forces, any invited guest, and the chief of staff present will move with him, and the other members of the staff (breaking by fours right in front) will follow at the respective distances mentioned above, the left of each rank of fours being directly behind the reviewing officer.

6. After reviewing the front and rear of the line the reviewing officer will resume his position in front of it, and the staff is again formed as before indicated.

7. When general officers dismount in front of their commands, before being passed in review by their superiors in rank, their staff officers must occupy the position required by paragraph 354, Army Regulations, to wit:

“When two or more battalions are to be reviewed, they will be formed in parade order with the proper intervals, and will also perform the same movements that are laid down for a single battalion, observing the additional directions that are given for such movements when applied to the line. The brigadier-general and his staff, on foot, will place themselves opposite the centre of the brigade; the brigadier-general two paces in front of the rank of colonels, his aid two paces on his right, and one retired; and the other brigade staff officers, those having the rank of field officers in the rank of lieutenants-colonel and majors, and those below that rank in the line of company officers.”

8. In all reviews, the commander only of the division, brigade, or regiment, as the case may be, having put the column in motion, and arriving at the proper distance (after saluting the reviewing officer) will take his position one pace on the right, the head of his horse on a line with the haunches of the latter's horse. He will remain near the reviewing officer during the defile, after which he will rejoin his command.

9. The following paragraphs of Army Regulations will, in all cases required, be strictly observed, to wit: paragraphs 336, 337, 340, 342, 343, 344, 347, 348, 354, 355, 358, 360.

10. Staff officers will not draw their swords unless placed in actual command of troops.

11. Staff officers are expected to familiarize themselves with the general principles of cavalry tactics, and to adhere strictly to the rules prescribed for the dressings, the breakings by fours, the formations into line, etc., etc.

12. Officers on duty at reviews or elsewhere, when walking or riding together, will occupy positions according to rank: the senior on the right.

13. All staff officers will wear the badges prescribed in General Orders, No. 76, series 1862, from these headquarters, when on duty with their side arms.



